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Abstract
I develop an equilibrium matching model in which workers have preferences over con-
sumption and hours of work and are able to self-insure against unemployment risks by accu-
mulating precautionary wealth. Wages and working hours are the outcomes of Nash bargaining
between workers and firms. I focus on an unemployment insurance (UI) system with constant
benefits of indefinite duration financed through a constant labor income tax. Low-wealth in-
dividuals work unusually long hours to quickly accumulate precautionary wealth. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply governs a worker’s utility cost of supplying labor and hence the cost
of accumulating precautionary wealth. A lower elasticity implies a higher utility cost of ad-
justing hours. I take Frisch elasticities from recent research using household data and find that
the optimal level of UI benefits is between 34 and 40 percent of average compensation. The
potential welfare gains from moving from current 34 percent to the optimal policy are as large
as 0.13 percent of lifetime consumption. The optimal replacement rate is decreasing in the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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1 Introduction
Workers can self-insure to avoid a sharp drop in consumption during spells of unemployment
by accumulating precautionary wealth when they work. Self-insurance is an important, largely
unexplored, determinant of the welfare consequences of government-provided unemployment in-
surance (UI). The level of precautionary wealth balances the benefits of consumption-smoothing
against the loss of satisfaction from working extra hours to accumulate the wealth. I determine the
optimal UI replacement rate in a dynamic equilibrium matching model in which hours of work are
determined through bilateral bargaining between workers and firms, and borrowing-constrained
workers may save a risk-free asset. I find that the optimal UI replacement rate is increasing in
workers’ dislike for work as measured by the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and in their degree
of impatience as measured by their personal discount rate.
My approach advances earlier research in several ways. I build on Shimer and Werning’s
(2005) analysis and assume that the optimal UI policy consists of a constant benefit payment of
indefinite duration and a constant tax rate upon reemployment that is independent of the duration
of the previous unemployment spell. Most earlier analysis of UI is in a partial equilibrium frame-
work. I build a model based on the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) (MP) matching model which
describes a full equilibrium of the labor market. One advantage of using the MP model is that the
behavior of the employed is explicitly modeled, unlike, for example, in McCall’s (1970) partial
equilibrium model. This is important because the level of the UI replacement rate will not only
affect the welfare of the unemployed, but it also affects employed workers’ needs and incentives
to self-insure. Another appealing feature of the MP model is that wages are determined through
bilateral bargaining between a worker and a firm. This provides a convenient framework for the
determination of working hours, but it is also important because workers’ wealth levels determine
their outside option during the bargain, the value of being unemployed. Thus, as workers accumu-
late wealth, they bargain for higher wages and lower hours of work. Third, the role of individuals’
costs to self-insure in the determination of the optimal policy has been largely unexplored. To my
knowledge, Lentz (2005) was the first to note that the optimal replacement rate is decreasing in the
rate of return workers can achieve on their savings.
When I calibrate my model to match certain facts of the U.S. labor market, I find that the opti-
mal replacement rate is between 34 and 40 percent of average after-tax compensation, depending
on the social welfare function I consider. These results suggest that about half of the states in the
U.S. have replacement rates that are close to optimal.
Interestingly, when I do not allow workers to adjust hours, the optimal replacement rates are
lower than when hours are set efficiently. Low-wealth workers’ utility increases considerably with
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higher UI benefits because they are able to increase consumption and decrease hours of work
considerably. When workers are not allowed to adjust hours, the benefit of a higher replacement
rate decreases, while the cost, an increase in the unemployment rate, stays the same. Hence the
optimal replacement rate is lower to balance the marginal cost with the marginal benefit to the
worker.
Another interesting result is that the optimal replacement rate is increasing in the average du-
ration of unemployment. This suggests that the higher observed benefit rates in Europe may not
only be the cause of their unemployment problem, but may also be a result of their unemployment
problem.
My results suggest that not only do labor market characteristics and risk-aversion play impor-
tant roles in determining the optimal replacement rate, but that preferences over working hours and
properties of the asset market also play important roles.
2 Related literature
The rise in unemployment during the 1970s increased economists’ interest to study the interaction
between UI and labor market outcomes. While earlier research focused mostly on the income
support aspects of UI, much of the empirical and theoretical work since the 1970s has focused
on the incentive aspects of UI. A large empirical literature aimed at estimating the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to UI benefits, a measure of the degree to which UI benefit
levels affect workers’ incentives to search for jobs.
The theory that motivated this empirical work goes back to at least Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976) and Mortensen (1977). This line of research established that UI policy is tightly linked to
reservation wages and unemployment durations. Atkinson (1987) provides a thorough review of
the early empirical studies on the incentive effects of UI, while Atkinson and Micklewright (1991)
and Krueger and Meyer (2002) review the later literature. Although the early research produced
mixed results, more recent research indicates that the incentive effects are modest. Krueger and
Meyer argue that an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits of 0.5 is a reason-
able summary of the literature. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) provide the most recent survey
on unemployment insurance and incentive effects.
In recent papers, Chetty (2005) and Card, Chetty and Weber (2006) argue that the effect of
UI benefits on durations may be largely due to a non-distortionary income effect for individuals
who face borrowing constraints. Because UI benefits are transitory, Chetty (2005) argues, they
affect search behavior mostly through income effects, so that the efficiency costs of unemployment
3
insurance are smaller than widely believed.
Much of the literature on the normative issues of UI design can be grouped into two categories
according to how the labor market is modeled. The two most popular modeling choices include
variations of McCall’s (1970) partial equilibrium search model and Mortensen and Pissarides’s
(1994) (MP) equilibrium matching model. McCall focuses on the worker’s job search strategy
in a partial equilibrium setting where firms post wages and workers make acceptance decisions.
Employment is an absorbing state so that once a worker has found a job she stays in it forever.
The probability of job finding is partially under the control of the job seeker through her choice of
reservation wage, and in extensions of this model, her choice of search effort.
A potential disadvantage of wage posting models in general is the strong assumption that work-
ers and firms commit to the posted terms of trade. This point is especially important in the economy
I consider, because the joint surplus of a matched worker-firm pair, as well as the worker’s outside
option, change over time and depend on the worker’s dynamic saving decisions. Hence, work-
ers would want to change the terms of trade as they become wealthier and their outside option
changes. The MP matching model circumvents this criticism of wage-posting models. Job seekers
and firms trying to fill vacancies randomly find each other in an aggregate matching market and
determine the wage through bilateral bargaining. Arguably, this is a more appealing model of the
labor market, especially when workers’ saving decisions affect the bargaining position of one of
the parties as is the case in my model. In addition, I am not only interested in the determination of
wages, but also in the choice of working hours, which makes the bargaining approach even more
appealing. See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for an excellent survey of the literature on
search-theoretic models of the labor market.
The seminal papers on the normative issues of UI design were published in the late 1970s
and include Baily (1978), Flemming (1978), and Shavell and Weiss (1979). A general theme of
these papers is that more generous benefits decrease search effort and lead to longer unemployment
spells. Shavell and Weiss presented the first analysis of the optimal time path of UI benefits. Much
of the more recent literature extends their work by adding additional policy instruments or by using
equilibrium models.
Shavell and Weiss use McCall’s (1970) model to investigate the optimal time path of benefit
payments when job search effort is unobservable by the UI administrator. They derive two impor-
tant results. First, when workers are not allowed to borrow or save and if there is no moral hazard,
then the optimal benefit level should be constant during the entire unemployment spell. Second,
when there is moral hazard this result is overturned and the optimal benefit level must decline over
the unemployment spell in order to give the unemployed appropriate incentives to search. Shavell
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and Weiss also show that if the unemployed begin their spell with positive wealth, or if they are
allowed to borrow, and if they cannot influence the probability of getting a job, then the optimal
benefit level should be zero at first and then rise to a constant level. However, they were unable to
characterize the optimal benefit profile in the general case with moral hazard and initial wealth or
the ability to borrow. Shimer and Werning (2005) were the first to accomplish this.
Building on Shavell and Weiss’s analysis, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) increase the number
of policy instruments available and allow the UI administrator to impose a wage tax after reemploy-
ment that may depend on the duration of a worker’s unemployment spell. They find that benefits
should decrease throughout the unemployment spell and that the wage tax upon reemployment
should increase with the length of the unemployment spell. Compared to Shavell and Weiss, this
two-instrument policy has the advantage of improving intertemporal consumption smoothing as
well as intertemporal incentives.
In a more recent paper, Shimer and Werning (2005) build on the analysis in Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997) and allow workers access to capital markets. As in Shavell and Weiss (1979) and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning focus on the decision problem of the unem-
ployed and find that when workers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences and
sufficiently good access to capital markets, the optimal policy involves a constant benefit schedule
of unlimited duration combined with a constant tax rate during employment that is independent of
the duration of a worker’s previous unemployment spell. Although this result breaks down with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, they find that constant UI benefits combined
with a constant tax upon reemployment are approximately optimal with CRRA preferences. The
intuition for this result is simple: As unemployment spells continue, workers deplete their assets
in order to buy consumption goods. With a fixed benefit schedule, their consumption declines
over time as their wealth decreases. As a result, workers’ marginal utilities of consumption in-
crease during unemployment spells which increases their incentives to search. As in my model, UI
benefits play the dual role of providing insurance against the uncertain duration of unemployment
spells and ensures that workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption. One disad-
vantage of using McCall’s (1970) partial equilibrium model is that Shimer and Werning are unable
to investigate how their choice of benefit timing affects the saving decision of employed workers,
which in turn determines the wealth level of the unemployed.
The result that benefits should decrease with unemployment duration has been questioned by
several other authors. Werning (2002) and Kocherlakota (2004), for example, study the optimal
UI design problem with unobservable savings and find that once the direct link between income
and consumption is broken, the optimal income path during unemployment may be constant (see
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Kocherlakota, 2004), or in some cases even upward sloping (Werning, 2002). In an equilibrium
search model without savings, Davidson and Woodbury (1997) find that the optimal UI policy
consists of indefinite benefit payments and a replacement rate of 0.66. Their numerical examples
suggest that the optimal replacement rate is as high as 1.3 when benefits are paid only for 26 weeks
as currently in the U.S.
In contrast to this line of research, I do not investigate the optimal timing of benefits. As
will become clear in Section 7, Shimer and Werning’s (2005) line of argument also applies to
my model and, to simplify an already complicated model, I assume that the optimal UI benefit
path is constant with an indefinite duration. The focus of my work is on the interaction between
the optimal replacement rate and the cost of self-insuring. Instead of using a partial equilibrium
model, I use an equilibrium matching model and allow workers and firms to bargain over wages
and hours of work. I also pay closer attention to the choice and calibration of preferences, which
previous authors usually chose for analytical convenience. For example, while my reading of
micro studies on the intertemporal substitution of consumption suggests that individuals are quite
risk-averse, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Shimer and Werning (2005) choose low levels of
risk-aversion with CRRA coefficients of 0.5 and 1.5, respectively.
Several other authors consider the effects of UI benefits on asset accumulation. Hansen and
I˙mrohorogˇlu (1992) develop a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model in which workers
are employed and work a fixed number of hours at a fixed wage, or unemployed and receive
UI benefits and enjoy leisure. In addition to government-provided insurance, workers may self-
insure by saving a non-interest-bearing asset. Each period, workers face an exogenously given
probability of receiving an employment opportunity that is identical for all workers and across
time. The source of moral hazard stems from the UI administration’s inability to perfectly monitor
program applicants. Workers may decline job opportunities and still receive benefits with a positive
probability. This probability determines the degree of the moral hazard problem. Because workers
receive utility from leisure, they will decline to work if they have sufficiently high assets. The role
of unemployment insurance then is not only to help individuals smooth consumption, but also to
subsidize leisure of the wealthy. Hansen and I˙mrohorogˇlu find potentially large welfare benefits
from introducing UI and that saving drops to zero with the optimal replacement rate and no moral
hazard. They determine the optimal UI replacement rate to be 65 percent with no moral hazard
and as low as 5 percent with extreme moral hazard.
Wang and Williamson (2002) develop a model that combines aspects from Hansen and I˙mrohorogˇlu
(1992) and Wang and Williamson (1996). As in Hansen and I˙mrohorogˇlu (1992), employed work-
ers receive a fixed wage when employed, capital markets are incomplete, and workers may self-
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insure by saving a non-interest-bearing asset. As in Wang and Williamson (1996), moral hazard
arises from a worker’s unobserved effort decision, which not only determines the transitions into
employment, but also those into unemployment. Their analysis focuses on the effects that experi-
ence rating and changes in the level and duration of UI benefits have on search behavior, shirking
by the employed, unemployment, and welfare. They find that the optimal benefit schedule is U-
shaped. Benefits are low in the beginning, then drop to zero before they rise again above initial
levels. They find that welfare gains from changing the current system are small. ? introduces
capital into this economy and finds that the optimal UI benefit level is negative. This result arises
because UI seriously distorts labor and capital markets in his economy.
My work differs from these papers along several dimensions. First, I focus on the interaction
between the cost of self-insuring and the optimal replacement rate, a point these authors do not
speak to. Second, I use an equilibrium matching model in which wages and working hours are
set efficiently. Hansen and I˙mrohorogˇlu (1992) assume that employed workers have to spend an
exogenously given amount of time at work, while Wang and Williamson (2002) do not model
the intensive margin of labor supply. Using a bargaining approach is important because workers’
wealth affect their bargaining positions and hence influence the efficient choices of hours and the
compensation they receive. Workers in my model not only make ample use of savings to smooth
consumption, but the efficient determination of hours implies that they also make considerable
use of adjustments in hours of work to smooth consumption. The employed work a lot when
consumption is relatively low. Hansen and I˙mrohorogˇlu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002)
also choose low levels of risk-aversion with coefficients of relative risk aversion of 1.5 and 1.0,
respectively.
Several other papers have considered the optimal UI design using search models in which
workers may save. For example, Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001) study the general equi-
librium effects of UI in an incomplete markets environment with job search, while Lentz (2005)
determines the optimal UI benefit level in an estimated job search model using Danish micro data.
Several recent papers have assessed optimal UI design in matching models. Cahuc and Lehmann
(2000) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) investigate the optimal time path of UI benefits with
endogenous search effort of the unemployed. The two papers differ in how wages are determined
and in the exact specifications of the policy instruments they consider. Cahuc and Lehmann assume
that wages are set by union-firm bargaining that gives rise to an insider/outsider problem. Because
wages strongly respond to the timing of UI benefits, the authors argue, the advantages associated
with a declining time path decrease. In Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) wages are the outcome
of bilateral bargaining between workers and firms. The authors find that the optimal time path is
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declining over the unemployment spell. Coles and Masters (2006) analyze UI in a matching model
with strategic bargaining and highlight the potentially welfare-increasing effects of job creation
subsidies in conjunction with optimal UI benefit levels.
My work differs from these studies in that I focus on workers’ ability to self-insure. A major
technical difficulty these authors disregarded arises from the dynamic saving decision of workers.
An individual’s wealth level affects the quality of her outside option and hence influences the
bargain over hours and compensation. Moreover, the aggregate wealth distribution affects firms’
incentives to post vacancies. I also pay much closer attention to the calibration of preferences and
of other parameter choices.
3 Model
I extend a variation of the MP matching model along three important dimensions. First, workers
are risk-averse and have preferences over consumption and hours of work. Second, I model the
intensive margin of labor supply by assuming that hours of work are determined through bilateral
bargaining between workers and firms. Third, workers may self-insure through savings but face
liquidity constraints.
Time is discrete, a period is equal to one month, and the economy is populated by a unit
measure of infinitely lived individuals who may either be employed or unemployed. Employed
workers receive compensation wh, where w is the hourly wage and h is the number of working
hours, and face an exogenously fixed hazard s of job loss. The unemployed receive government-
provided benefits b and face a probability f of finding a suitable job. Individuals do not have
access to insurance markets and cannot borrow against future income, but they are able to hold a
risk-free asset at the exogenously given interest rate r. The government provides a UI system that
pays benefits b during all periods of unemployment and spends an exogenously given amount χ
on programs that individuals do not derive utility from. The government is required to balance the
budget and levies a labor income tax τ on workers’ compensation to finance its expenditures.
Workers are homogeneous with respect to productivity but differ in their asset holdings be-
cause of different employment histories. I assume that firms are able to fully observe workers’
assets after they match. This assumption is reasonable because for the majority of the population
an individual’s employment history is the main determinant of wealth. A job applicant’s employ-
ment history in form of a resume´ is usually accessible to an employer. Furthermore, this is a
simplifying assumption important for the worker-firm bargain over wages and hours. With asym-
metric information, bilateral bargaining may result in a continuum of equilibria, an issue beyond
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the scope of this paper (see, for example, Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989).
Another assumption I make is that the government is unable to observe a worker’s wealth level
and is thus unable to design a policy b(a) where the benefit level would depend on assets. Allowing
this would be an interesting project but is beyond the scope of this paper. See Hubbard, Skinner
and Zeldes (1995) for a discussion of the effects of means tested social insurance on precautionary
wealth.
There are two state variables in my model. One is the discrete labor market state of individuals
i ∈ {e, u}, and the other is the continuous variable asset holdings a.
3.1 Aggregate matching market
An important feature of the MP model is the existence of search frictions in the labor market. It
takes time for unemployed workers to meet suitable firms with unfilled vacancies. The number
of new matches is a function of the number of unemployed workers and the number of firms
posting vacancies. The aggregate matching market is characterized by the standard Cobb-Douglas
matching function
M(u, v) = ζuαv1−α, (1)
where M denotes the number of successful matches, u the number of unemployed workers search-
ing for a job, and v the number of available vacancies. The parameter ζ > 0 controls the efficiency
of the matching process and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
the number of unemployed workers u. Let θ = v/u be the ratio of vacancies to unemployment,
a measure of labor market tightness. Each period, an unemployed worker finds a new job with
probability f (θ) = M(u, v)/u, while a firm with a vacancy hires a new worker with per-period
probability f (θ)/θ.
In steady-state, the flows into and out of unemployment must equal, so that the steady-state
unemployment rate is given by
u =
s
s + f (θ)
. (2)
3.2 Individuals
Individual workers are either employed or unemployed. It is convenient to express the model in
terms of Bellman value-transition equations. Let U(a) be the value a worker associates with being
unemployed and searching for a new job when her asset level is a. Similarly, E(a) is the value of
an employed worker, and J(a) is the value a firm associates with employing a worker whose asset
level is a. Employed workers choose today’s consumption ce to maximize the value of employment
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E(a) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the exogenously given borrowing constraint
a
E(a) = max
ce
{
u(ce(a), h(a)) +
1
1 + ρ
[
sU(a′e) + (1 − s)E(a′e)
]}
(3)
subject to
ce(a) = (1 − τ)w(a)h(a) + (1 + r)a − a′e(a) (4)
a′e(a) ≥ a (5)
where u(c, h) is the momentary utility function, ρ is the subjective discount rate, s is the separation
rate, r is the exogenously given risk-free interest rate, w is the hourly wage, h is the number of
working hours, and a′ are next period’s assets. τ is a labor income tax the government uses to
finance its budget. I index consumption and next period’s assets by the current labor market state
e. Because this is an incomplete market model in which workers lack full insurance, consumption
depends on a worker’s current labor market state and asset level. Employed workers always find
it optimal to increase their savings relative to the borrowing limit, up to some upper threshold, so
that this constraint will never bind for them.
Unemployed workers solve a similar problem. They choose cu to maximize the value of unem-
ployment U(a) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the borrowing constraint
U(a) = max
cu
{
u(cu(a), 0) +
1
1 + ρ
[
f (θ)E(a′u) + (1 − f (θ))U(a′u)
]}
(6)
subject to
cu(a) = b + (1 + r)a − a′u(a) (7)
a′u(a) ≥ a (8)
where b represents the monetary value of government-provided unemployment insurance benefits.
I abstract from other sources of income such as severance payments, spousal support, etc. By
definition, the unemployed do not spend any time working so that h = 0. I define the replacement
rate δ as
δ =
b
E[(1 − τ)w(a)h(a)] , (9)
where E[(1 − τ)w(a)h(a)] = ∫ ∞
a
(1 − τ)w(a)h(a) dGe(a) is the average after-tax compensation, and
Ge(a) the steady-state wealth distribution of the employed.
Note that I do not consider job-search decisions by the unemployed. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that workers spend a minuscule amount of time on job-search activities. According to data
from the American Time Use Survey (2004), the average unemployed worker in 2004 spent 3
10
minutes per day searching for a job, or only about 0.2 percent of available time. The average un-
employed worker spent three times more on religious and spiritual activities, four times more on
volunteer activities, and 124 times more on socializing, relaxing, and leisure than on job search.
I assume that workers do not think strategically when making their consumption/saving deci-
sions. Since workers’ asset levels affect their bargaining position, strategic workers would want to
choose consumption and next period’s assets to smooth consumption and to better their bargaining
position in the next period. Because I want to focus on precautionary saving behavior, I assume
that workers do not behave strategically. I discuss in web Appendix D1 how strategic behavior
would affect my calculations.
Given this assumption and assuming an interior solution, the workers’ decision problem can be
characterized by two Euler equations, one for each employment state. The optimal consumption
choices of the employed satisfy
uce(ce(a), h(a)) =
1 + r
1 + ρ
[
sucu(cu(a
′), 0) + (1 − s)uce(ce(a′), h(a′))
]
, (10)
while the optimal consumption choices of the unemployed satisfy
ucu(cu(a), 0) =
1 + r
1 + ρ
[
f (θ)uce(ce(a
′), h(a′)) + (1 − f (θ))ucu(cu(a′), 0)
]
. (11)
3.3 Firms
A firm’s value of a filled job J(a) is given by the flow profits it receives from employing a worker
with assets a plus the expected present value of continuing the employment relationship
J(a) = [m − w(a)]h(a) + 1 − s
1 + r
J(a′). (12)
I assume that firms are homogeneous, so that the marginal revenue product m is constant across all
matches.
Firms expand recruiting efforts to the point where the cost k of posting a vacancy equals the
expected value of a filled job, so that the value of a vacancy is zero. The corresponding Bellman
equation is
k =
f (θ)/θ
1 + r
E[J(a′)], (13)
where f (θ)/θ is the probability of hiring a worker, and E[J(a′)] =
∫ ∞
a
J(a′) dGu(a′) is the expected
value of a filled job conditional on having hired a worker. Gu(a) is the steady-state wealth distri-
bution of the unemployed, induced by the workers’ consumption/saving decisions.
1The web Appendix is available at http://felixr.googlepages.com/webapp.pdf
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3.4 Wages and hours
As is standard in matching models, I assume that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. I
further assume that working hours are also determined by bilateral bargaining. Bargaining over
working hours has previously been discussed by Earle and Pencavel (1990) and Auray and Dan-
thine (2005). Ham and Reilly (2002) reject the hypothesis that workers face hours constraints,
which is consistent with my assumption of efficient bargaining over working hours. Both wages
and hours are renegotiated every period.
The matched worker-firm pair chooses wages and hours by solving
max
w(a),h(a)
(E(a) − U(a))φJ(a)1−φ (14)
subject to
ce(a) = (1 − τ)w(a)h(a) + (1 + r)a − a′e(a), (15)
where E(a) − U(a) is the surplus a worker with asset level a enjoys from employment, and J(a)
is the associated surplus of the firm. The firm’s outside option, the value of posting a vacancy, is
zero. The worker’s bargaining weight is φ (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for an
interpretation of this parameter).
The solution to the wage problem is given by
φ
∂(E(a) − U(a))
∂w(a)
J(a) + (1 − φ) ∂J(a)
∂w(a)
(E(a) − U(a)) = 0, (16)
which can be rewritten as
φ
(1 − φ) J(a) =
E(a) − U(a)
uc(ce(a), h(a))(1 − τ) , (17)
where (E(a) − U(a))/uc is the worker’s surplus in units of consumption. This equation is a gen-
eralization of the standard surplus sharing rule with linear utility when ∂E/∂w = 1. Note that
equation (17) is also the solution to a bargain over total compensation wh. I focus on wages and
hours separately, because changes in the benefit level have clear predictions for those variables,
while the effect on compensation depends on the product of the effects on wages and hours and is
not necessarily monotone.
Similarly, the solution to the hours problem is given by
φ
∂(E(a) − U(a))
∂h(a)
J(a) + (1 − φ)∂J(a)
∂h(a)
(E(a) − U(a)) = 0 (18)
The optimal choice of hours weighs the benefits of an additional hour to the firm against the
benefits to the worker. Intuitively, the worker-firm pair chooses working hours to maximize the
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joint surplus and chooses compensation wh to split the surplus. Because of my assumption that
a firm’s surplus depends linearly on hours, it is a worker’s preferences over hours that determine
working hours and the size of the total surplus.
Combining equations (16) and (18), I can write
−uh(ce(a), h(a))
uc(ce(a), h(a))(1 − τ) = m (19)
This equation is the standard bilateral efficiency condition and states that the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure must equal the marginal rate of transformation. See
web Appendix E for a derivation of these results. The choice of hours makes sure that the worker-
firm pair is on the contract curve, while the choice of compensation determines the location on the
contract curve.
Because the surplus of a worker E(a)−U(a) is a decreasing function of wealth, the joint surplus
of a matched worker-firm pair is also a decreasing function of a worker’s wealth level. In terms of
units of consumption, it is given by
S (a) =
E(a) − U(a)
uc(ce(a), h(a))(1 − τ) + J(a) (20)
3.5 Government
The main function of the government is to provide insurance that is not available in the market. It
raises revenues by levying the labor income tax τ and uses the revenues to pay benefits b to the u
unemployed workers and to finance general expenditures χ. I assume that the government has to
run a balanced budget, a reasonable assumption in a steady-state model, and that individuals do
not derive utility from expenditures χ. Budget balance requires that
u b + χ = (1 − u)τ
∫ ∞
a
w(a)h(a) dGe(a), (21)
where Ge(a) is the endogenous steady-state wealth distribution of the employed, induced by the
workers’ consumption/saving decisions.
3.6 Equilibrium
Definition Given the parameters of the model, a stationary equilibrium is characterized by the
pair of consumption policy functions ce(a) and cu(a), the wage function w(a), the hours function
h(a), the three value functions E(a), U(a), and J(a), the steady-state distributions of assets for the
employed and the unemployed, Ge(a) and Gu(a), the vacancy-unemployment ratio θ, and the tax
rate τ such that
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1. Given w(a), h(a), θ, and τ, the consumption policy functions ce(a) and cu(a) solve equations
(10) and (11).
2. The policy functions ce(a) and cu(a) induce the stationary wealth distributions for the em-
ployed, Ge(a), and the unemployed, Gu(a).
3. Given ce(a), cu(a), w(a), h(a), θ, and τ, the value functions E(a), U(a), and J(a) solve equa-
tions (3), (6), and (12).
4. Given ce(a), cu(a), E(a), U(a), J(a), Ge(a), and Gu(a)
(a) The wage function w(a) and the hours function h(a) satisfy equations (16) and (18).
(b) The vacancy-unemployment ratio θ solves equation (13).
(c) The income tax τ satisfies the budget balance condition of equation (21).
(d) The intertemporal budget constraints, equations (4) and (7), and the borrowing con-
straints, equations (5) and (8) are satisfied.
4 Preferences
The specification and calibration of preferences is of central importance when modeling individual
decision making. I follow Hall (2006b), who uses evidence from the large literature on labor sup-
ply, the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, and consumption-hours cross-effects to calibrate
a utility function with a fairly general functional form. In particular, Hall suggests working with
Frisch systems. Frisch elasticities keep the marginal utility of wealth constant, are a convenient
way to characterize preferences, and are commonly used in modern labor economics. Because
of the lack of full insurance markets in my model, an individual’s marginal utility of consump-
tion varies over time. However, the majority of workers in my model are close to being fully
self-insured. See Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) for a discussion of Frisch systems.
The Frisch (or λ-constant) labor supply and consumption demand functions satisfy
uh(c, h, λ) = −λw (22)
uc(c, h, λ) = λp (23)
where λ, the marginal utility of wealth, is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Using
these two equations, I can solve for the Frisch elasticities of labor supply η, and consumption
demand ϕ, as
η(c, h) ≡ ∂h
∂w
w
h
∣∣∣∣∣
λ
=
uhucc
uccuhh − uhcuch
1
h
(24)
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ϕ(c, h) ≡ ∂c
∂p
p
c
∣∣∣∣∣
λ
=
ucuhh
uccuhh − uhcuch
1
c
(25)
Both elasticities are functions of current consumption c and working hours h. Note that the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is not defined for unemployed individuals and that the Frisch elasticity
of consumption demand for unemployed individuals is given by ϕ(c, 0) = uc/uccc, which is the
negative of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. I derive both elasticities in web Appendix
F.
4.1 Functional form
I assume the period utility function proposed by Malin (2006) and used by Hall (2006b)
u(c, h) =
1
1 − µ
[c−(1/σ−1) − c−(1/σ−1)
1/σ − 1 −
γ
1 + 1/ψ
h1+1/ψ
]1−µ
(26)
where σ is the curvature parameter for consumption, ψ is the curvature parameter for work, and
µ determines the degree to which consumption and hours of work are complements or substitutes.
If µ is positive, consumption and hours of work are complements so that uch > 0. The parameter
c determines the point at which the kernel inside the brackets is zero and only matters for speci-
fications with µ , 0. For individuals who do not work (h = 0), the kernel inside the brackets is
zero when c = c. The parameter γ governs the distaste for work, or alternatively can be thought of
as the efficiency of home production (see Becker, 1965). As Malin discusses, this functional form
nests several of the specifications commonly used in the literature.
There are a total of six parameters to choose. I normalize the product price p = 1, assume
c = 0.2, and set γ = 1. To choose the remaining three parameters, σ, ψ, and µ, I draw upon micro
studies on the intertemporal substitution in consumption, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and
the complementarity between consumption and working hours, which I discuss in web Appendix
B.
5 Parameters
My model operates at a monthly frequency and has a total of 17 parameters, 6 of which are pref-
erence parameters. I aim to match the relevant characteristics of the post-World War II period
U.S. labor market and choose the preference parameters to match the findings discussed in web
Appendix B.
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5.1 Preferences
Given my normalization of the product price p = 1 and my choices of c = 0.2 and γ = 1, there
are three remaining preference parameters, σ, ψ, and µ. I choose to calibrate to an average Frisch
elasticity of consumption demand of ϕ = −0.35, an average Frisch elasticity of labor supply of
η = 0.69, and an average consumption drop of ω = 0.1 when becoming unemployed. The resulting
parameters are provided in Table 1.
These calibration choices imply that workers are on average quite risk-averse. I calculate risk
aversion as −uccc/uc, which averages about 3.1 at the calibration point. See Chetty (2006) for a
discussion of risk aversion when hours of work are included in preferences.
5.2 Labor market
Several authors have estimated separation rates for the U.S. labor market. The evidence presented
by Shimer (2005a, 2005b), Nagypa´l (2004), and Abowd and Zellner (1985) suggests that the sepa-
ration rate s is quite constant over time with an average value of about 0.034. Hall (2005b) surveys
the evidence on job-finding and separation rates. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) the average unemployment rate between January 1948 and July 2006 was 5.62 percent. Us-
ing s = 0.034 and u = 0.056, the steady-state unemployment equation (2) implies that the average
monthly job-finding rate is f = 0.57. This estimate is slightly higher than the 0.45 that Shimer
(2005a) finds. These values imply that the average job lasts approximately 29 months and the aver-
age unemployment spell about 7.5 weeks. For the period between 1967 and 2006, the BLS reports
that the average unemployment spell lasted about 14 weeks, while the median unemployment spell
lasted about 7 weeks.
Another important characteristic of the labor market is captured by the parameter α. In the
context of the model this parameter governs how much the unemployment rate changes in response
to changes in UI benefits. Shimer (2005a) calculates the elasticity of the matching function α to
be 0.72, while Hall (2005a) finds a value of 0.245. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) report values
ranging from about 0.3 to 0.7. In light of this mixed evidence, I choose α = 0.5, a value also
used by Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001). I investigate how this
choice affects the optimal policy in web Appendix C.3.
I normalize the vacancy-unemployment ratio to θ = 0.5. Given my choice of matching func-
tion, the vacancy-unemployment ratio is inherently meaningless at the calibration point. I could
simply adjust the value of the efficiency parameter ζ to accommodate other values for the vacancy-
unemployment ratio. Using equation (1), these values imply the matching efficiency parameter
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ζ = 0.81. From equation (13) I calculate the flow cost of posting a vacancy to be k = 1.39, which
is equivalent to about five weeks of average compensation.
I set the marginal revenue product to m = 2 and choose the bargaining weight φ = 0.5. The
choice of φ is not completely innocuous as it does effect the optimal policy, but is standard in the
literature. I will investigate the implications of other values for φ in web Appendix C.4.
The last labor market parameter to choose is the UI benefit b, or alternatively the UI replace-
ment rate δ. The Department of Labor (2006) reports an average replacement rate of 36 percent
in the first quarter of 2006, with a high of 53 percent for Hawaii and a low of 24 percent for the
District of Columbia (see Table 16 in web Appendix I). According to the Congressional Budget
Office (2004), the median replacement rate of the long-term unemployed (more than four consec-
utive months of unemployment) was 40 percent and ranged from 24 to 64 percent, depending on
previous earnings. While only 40 percent of all unemployed received UI benefits, approximately
80 percent of all job losers did. The difference is due to those who either exhausted their benefits or
were ineligible for other reasons (for example, entrants into the labor market). Engen and Gruber
(2001) report an average benefit replacement for the U.S. of 45 percent of covered workers’ last
earnings, while Martin (1996) reports a replacement rate of 34 percent for the U.S. The level of
the replacement rate at the calibration point also affects the optimal policy. I choose to calibrate to
Martin’s value of δ = 0.34 and investigate other values in web Appendix C.5.
I set the exogenous government spending to 20 percent of aggregate output, or χ = 0.32.
Together with the spending on UI benefits, this implies a tax rate of τ = 0.221, which lies between
the aggregate mean U.S. marginal and average tax rates. See Table 15 in web Appendix I for
NBER data on marginal and average tax rates in the U.S. Since the marginal and the average tax
rates in my model are the same, these numbers seem reasonable.
5.3 Asset market
The interest rate r and the subjective discount rate ρ also play an important role in determining
optimal policy. The larger the difference between r and ρ the more costly it is for workers to hold
assets. Lentz (2005) shows that the optimal UI benefit level is decreasing in the interest rate. I set
the annual interest rate to 3 percent and the annual subjective discount rate to 5 percent, resulting
in r = 0.00247 and ρ = 0.00407.
I set r < ρ for two reasons. First, I believe this to be a feature of reality. Most U.S. households
hold very few assets and are unlikely to have the ability to save at a risk-free rate close to their
individual discount rate. Data on individual wealth is consistent with this claim. Budrı´a Rodrı´guez,
Dı´az-Gime´nez, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull (2002) provide details about the U.S. wealth distribution
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and find that households in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution own about 35 percent
of the total wealth, while households in the top 20 percent hold 82 percent of total wealth. On
the other hand, about 10 percent of households have either no wealth or negative net worth and
households in the bottom 40 percent of the wealth distribution own only 1.0 percent of the total
wealth. According to Deaton (1991), the median household wealth, excluding pension rights and
housing, is about $1,000. Deaton also discusses why assuming r < ρ is appealing when modeling
average consumers.
The second reason is technical. Aiyagari (1994) shows that in economies with uninsurable
idiosyncratic shocks and an infinite horizon the interest rate must be strictly smaller than the sub-
jective discount rate, r < ρ. If r ≥ ρ, then workers would want to accumulate an infinite amount of
assets so that the wealth distribution would not be bounded from above. Intuitively, the presence
of precautionary motives increases the returns to assets. Thus, for a stationary equilibrium to exist
it must be that r < ρ.
Given r < ρ, workers only want to accumulate enough assets to smooth consumption in
the chance of becoming unemployed. That is, workers only save for precautionary reasons (see
Schechtman and Escudero, 1977). In a general equilibrium model the choices of r and ρ would
imply an empirically observable value for the median wealth to income ratio, W/Y in the litera-
ture. Carroll, Dynan and Krane (2003) use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and report
a median W/Y of 1.54 for 1989 and 1.37 for 1992. Since the only reason individuals save in my
model is for precautionary reasons, my model is not able to replicate the U.S. wealth distribution.
The relevant statistic to consider is the ratio of precautionary wealth to income and not the ratio of
total wealth to income.
Carroll and Samwick (1998) estimate precautionary savings to amount to between 32 and 50
percent of wealth in their sample from the PSID, while Kennickell and Lusardi (2005) find that
precautionary wealth amounts to approximately 8 to 20 percent of total wealth. Hurst, Luoh,
Stafford and Gale (1998) report that the average wealth to income ratio of individuals aged 24 to
34 was 0.31 in 1989. At this age, individuals are unlikely to have accumulated much life-cycle
related wealth and hence correspond most closely to individuals in my model.
My choices for r and ρ imply a median precautionary wealth-to-income ratio of 0.30, which is
equivalent to a total wealth-to-income ratio of 1.54 if precautionary wealth is 19 percent of total
wealth and close to the W/Y ratio of the 24 to 34 old individuals in Hurst et al.’s sample. Following
a similar strategy but using different data, Domeij and Flode´n (2006) set r = 0.02 and ρ = 0.053.
The last parameter to choose is the borrowing constraint a. The exact borrowing constraint
only matters marginally in my model as long as it is of a reasonable size, although it does affect the
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Parameter / 
Variable Interpretation Value Source
u Unemployment rate 0.056 BLS
θ Vacancy/unemployment ratio 0.50 Normalization
φ Frisch elasticity of consumption demand -0.35
η Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.69
ω Consumption drop at unemployment 0.10
σ Curvature over consumption 0.41 Calibration 
ψ Curvature over hours 1.09 Calibration 
μ Degree of complementarity 5.90 Calibration 
c Intercept of the utility function kernel 0.20 Hall (2006)
γ Distaste for work 1.00 Normalization
ζ Efficiency of matching 0.81 Calibration 
α Elasticity of matching function 0.50
s Job separation rate 0.034 Shimer (2005)
f Job finding rate 0.57 Calibration
Ф Workers' bargaining weight 0.50
k Cost of posting vacancy 1.39 Calibration
m Marginal revenue product 2.00 Normalization
δ Unemployment replacement rate 0.34 Martin (1996)
ra Annual risk-free interest rate 0.03
ρa Annual subjective discount rate 0.05
a Borrowing constraint 0
χ Exogenous government spending 0.32 Calibration
Calibration Targets
Parameters
Table 1: Calibration targets and parameter choices
median wealth-to-income ratio. Since workers only save for precautionary reasons, they mostly
care about being sufficiently far away from the constraint and less about the level of their assets.
I assume that workers may save but not borrow, so that the constraint is a = 0. There is
ample evidence that a large fraction of the population is credit constrained. According to Deaton
(1991), “approximately one fifth of total consumption is accounted for by households who not only
possess no stocks or bonds, but who have neither a checking nor a saving account” (p.1222). It is
hard to imagine that these individuals are able to borrow money from others than relatives. Jappelli
(1990) reports more direct evidence for liquidity constraints and Rendon (2006) finds evidence for
very tight borrowing constraints. Using data from the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Labor Market Experience, Rendon finds that individuals can only borrow l4 percent of
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the present value of their risk-free income. Nirei (2006) finds support for a borrowing constraint
worth three months of average wage income. I experimented with constraints equivalent to two
years worth of average income without any significant changes in the results.
Throughout the paper, I will refer to this calibrated economy as the baseline economy. I provide
a summary of the model parameters in Table 1.
6 Solution method
My model has two state variables. In addition to the binary variable describing an individual’s
labor market state i ∈ {e, u}, the model has the continuous state variable asset holdings a. Using
the methods laid out in chapters 6 and 11 in Judd (1998) I solve for the model’s steady-state
equilibrium numerically, using projection methods to simultaneously solve for the four non-linear
policy and three non-linear value functions of my model.
The unknown policy functions I solve for are the consumption choices for the employed and
unemployed, ĉe(a) and ĉu(a), and the wage and hours functions, ĥ(a) and ŵ(a). These policy func-
tions satisfy equations (10), (11), (16), and (18). The unknown value functions I solve for are the
value of employment, Ê(a), the value of unemployment, Û(a), and the value of the firm, Ĵ(a).
These functions correspond to equations (3), (6), and (12). Following Judd’s recommendations,
I represent the policy and value functions as Chebyshev polynomials. In order to better estimate
these functions close to the borrowing constraint, where their curvature is highest, I choose Cheby-
shev polynomials of degree 10 and perform a non-linear change of variables in assets.
The consumption functions, together with the budget constraints (equations (4) and (7)), induce
the two stationary wealth distributionsGe andGu, which I approximate as Ĝe and Ĝu. Following the
procedure outlined in Hall (2006a), I use the continuous policy functions ĉe(a) and ĉu(a), and the
budget constraints to calculate a 1500× 1500 Markov transition matrix that describes the workers’
transitions between employment states and wealth levels. Using this Markov transition matrix I
calculate the joint distribution of labor market states and wealth holdings G. I then calculate the
marginal distributions of G. These calculations result in distributions that are indistinguishable
from those obtained by simulating employment histories over hundreds of thousands of months.
The interested reader should refer to Appendix A and the web Appendix G for more informa-
tion about the solution procedure.
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Figure 1: Monthly saving of the employed and unemployed as functions of current wealth. Saving
and current wealth are measured in units of average monthly consumption of the employed.
7 Properties of the baseline economy
In this section I describe the properties of the baseline economy with the parameters set to those
discussed in Section 5. Understanding the saving decisions of workers is key to understanding the
properties of the model. Figure 1 shows the saving behavior of the employed and the unemployed
as functions of current wealth, where wealth is measured in units of average monthly consumption
of the employed. Employed workers save a positive fraction of monthly income up to a certain
threshold, equivalent to approximately 4 months of average consumption. As employed workers
accumulate wealth, their need for more precautionary savings declines. Workers who start out with
zero assets reach the upper threshold after about 10 years of continuous employment at which point
they will stop accumulating more wealth. The separation rate of 3.4 percent per month implies that
the average job lasts approximately 30 months and the probability of being continually employed
for at least 10 years is only 1.6 percent. The average employed worker saves about 1.5 percent of
after-tax compensation and holds assets worth 3.5 months of average monthly consumption.
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Figure 2: Consumption and wealth distributions of the employed and unemployed as functions
of current wealth. Consumption and current wealth are measured in units of average monthly
consumption of the employed.
Unemployed workers always want to dissave in order to keep a smooth consumption profile.
The average after-tax compensation of the employed is about 1 unit of average monthly consump-
tion. The government subsidizes the unemployed with only 34 percent of average compensation,
so that the consumption drop would be large if workers were unable to self-insure through savings.
The average unemployed worker dissaves assets worth half a unit of average monthly consump-
tion and consumes about 86 percent of average monthly consumption. This implies an average
uncompensated consumption drop of 12.4 percent when a worker becomes unemployed.
While the average worker generally does a good job of self-insuring and avoiding low asset
levels, few individuals are close to the borrowing constraint. Only 0.2 percent of the total pop-
ulation and only 1.1 percent of the unemployed own assets worth less than 1 month of average
consumption. The proportion of individuals with assets less than 0.5 is close to zero: 0.04 percent
for the total population and 0.27 percent for the unemployed.
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As Figure 2 shows, individuals’ wealth levels directly affect their consumption. As the em-
ployed accumulate more savings, their saving rate decreases and consumption, measured relative
to the average consumption, increases from a low 0.89 at the borrowing constraint to a high 1.01
a the maximum wealth level, a 13 percent difference. Consumption of the unemployed decreases
with unemployment duration and is lowest for those closest to the borrowing constraint. Their
consumption, also measured relative to average consumption of the employed, decreases from a
high 0.89 at the highest wealth level to a low 0.34 at the borrowing constraint. The consumption
of a no-wealth worker jumps from 0.34 to 0.89 when finding employment, a 160 percent increase.
Figure 2 also shows the steady-state distributions over wealth for both worker groups. From
the shape of the distribution it is clear that my model is unable to replicate the observed wealth
distribution of the U.S. with its large skewness to the right (see, for example, Budrı´a Rodrı´guez et
al., 2002, for data on the U.S. wealth distribution) and instead is skewed to the left. This should
not come as a surprise as my model abstracts from worker heterogeneity, life-cycle motives, and
inheritances. The only reason why individuals accumulate and hold wealth in my model is for
precautionary reasons.
To understand the shapes of the wealth distributions, it is instructive to look at the Euler equa-
tions (10) and (11). These equations show that the employed plan consumption with the expec-
tation of becoming unemployed with probability s while the unemployed plan consumption with
the expectation of becoming employed with probability f . At the calibration point, the job-finding
rate is 0.57 so that the average unemployment spell lasts about 7.5 weeks. Only about 8 percent
of the unemployed remain jobless for longer than 3 months. In comparison, the average employ-
ment spell lasts about 30 months. Individuals spend much more time employed and building up
precautionary wealth than unemployed and dissaving.
However, once unemployed, individuals move quickly towards the borrowing constraint. While
it takes an employed worker about 10 years to reach the upper bound of savings, conditional on
no job-loss, it takes the unemployed who start out at the highest wealth level only 10 months of
continuous unemployment to reach the borrowing constraint. The high job-finding rate makes this
an extremely unlikely event: the probability of remaining unemployed for 10 months is only 0.01
percent. As a comparison, an unemployed worker with maximum wealth experiences a 10 percent
decrease in consumption after about 5 months of continuous unemployment, while an unemployed
worker with average wealth experiences the same decrease after only 3 months of continuous
unemployment. Both events are quite unlikely. The first carries a probability of 1.4 percent while
the latter carries an 8 percent probability of realizing. These statistics highlight another unrealistic
part of my highly stylized model. All workers are equally productive and face the same stochastic
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Figure 3: Hours, wages, and after-tax compensation of the employed as functions of current wealth.
Current wealth is measured in units of average monthly consumption of the employed.
probability of job loss and of finding employment.
Note that not all of the observed differences in consumption between employed and unem-
ployed workers is due to a lack of insurance markets. As I argue in web Appendix B.3, consump-
tion and hours of work are complements. Even with full insurance, the unemployed would choose
to consume less. While consumption for the wealthiest workers only drops by 12 percent, it drops
by 60 percent for workers with no wealth. Hence, lack of sufficient funds and insurance accounts
for the majority of the consumption difference for low-wealth workers.
Given the consumption patterns described above, it should not be surprising that low-wealth
unemployed workers benefit the most from finding employment. The joint surplus of a matched
worker-firm pair, given by equation (20), is a decreasing function of workers’ asset holdings. An
employed worker with no wealth has a high marginal utility of consumption relative to wealthier
workers and thus gains a lot more from finding employment. Equation (19) then requires that
the efficient choice of working hours must be relatively higher for a no-wealth worker. In fact, as
Figure 3 shows, an employed worker with no wealth works almost 40 percent more than the average
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worker. Because the outside option of no-wealth workers is extremely bad (that is, returning to
unemployment with very low consumption and hence a high marginal utility of consumption), her
bargaining position is much worse than that of the average worker. As a result, the hourly wage
of a no-wealth worker is 23 percent lower than that of the average worker. However, because no-
wealth workers work longer hours, their after-tax compensation is about 6 percent higher than that
of the average worker. As workers become wealthier, their wage increase and their labor supply
decreases. Firms prefer to employ poor workers. The combination of lower wages and longer
working hours means that a firm’s profit from employing a no-wealth worker is more than 12 times
higher than employing the average worker.
The fact that working hours decrease as wages increase indicates that much of the labor supply
of the poor is for consumption-smoothing purposes and for precautionary reasons, which is exactly
what equation (19) indicates. When consumption is relatively low, hours of work must be relatively
high. This result is not unique to my model. Pijoan-Mas (2006) analyzes a growth model with id-
iosyncratic labor market risk and compares a complete market economy with an incomplete market
economy. He finds that individuals make ample use of labor supply as a consumption smoothing
mechanism. In particular, low-wealth workers with low wage realizations work long hours to keep
consumption high, while wealthy workers with high wage realizations work relatively little be-
cause they already enjoy high consumption. In a complete markets economy workers’ base their
hours decision entirely on the labor-leisure trade-off. Idiosyncratic wage shocks do not carry any
wealth effects and the variation in working hours are only determined by the substitution effect.
This is no longer true in incomplete market economies, where idiosyncratic shocks directly affect
consumption.
Using synthetic data Domeij and Flode´n (2006) show that, conditional on the wage rate, low-
wealth workers work considerably more than high-wealth workers (see their Table 1). They find
that the existence of borrowing constraints biases labor supply elasticities downwards and confirm
their results using data from the PSID. In my model, hours of work decrease with increases in
wealth and wages. Although this seems counterintuitive at first, it is the result of an increase in the
wealth of borrowing constrained workers.
Some interesting implications arise in my model. Consider a young person entering this econ-
omy with no wealth and starting in unemployment. It will take her about 2 months to find a job
after which she will likely be continuously employed for the next 2.5 years. During her tenure, she
will experience an average wage growth of 0.8 percent per month, a decline in hours worked of
0.96 percent per month and an increase in consumption by 0.36 percent per month. After 2.5 years,
she will have accumulated savings worth more than 2.5 months of average consumption, which is
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72 percent of the wealth that an average worker holds.
The Frisch elasticities of consumption demand and labor supply are both functions of consump-
tion and working hours. The no-wealth unemployed have an elasticity of consumption demand of
about -0.15 while unemployed workers at the maximum wealth level have an elasticity of -0.31.
This compares to an average Frisch elasticity of consumption demand of -0.35 for the aggregate
economy. These values imply high risk aversion, ranging from a high 6.5 to a low 3.2 for the
unemployed. The Frisch elasticity of all employed is very close to -0.35, implying a risk aversion
of about 3.1. Workers become more risk-averse the closer they move towards the borrowing con-
straint, and their risk aversion increases when they become unemployed. Note that this is consistent
with the findings discussed in Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002). Workers with low wealth are
more risk-averse.
Similarly, workers closest to the borrowing constraint have the lowest Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. The elasticity for no-wealth workers is about 0.52, while that of the wealthiest individual
is only slightly higher than the 0.69 of the aggregate economy. This is consistent with the findings
of Domeij and Flode´n (2006).
8 Optimal unemployment insurance
I focus on an unemployment insurance scheme with constant benefits and an indefinite duration.
The scheme is financed through a constant labor income tax. The results in Shimer and Werning
(2005) suggest that such a scheme is close to optimal when workers are able to self-insure through
savings. My goal is to determine the optimal replacement rate and to understand the role workers’
cost of self-insurance plays in its determination.
I consider two social welfare functions discussed by Rawls (1971), the “Veil of Ignorance” and
the minimax functions. The first one maximizes the expected lifetime utility of a worker who does
not know her labor market state or wealth level, that is, the worker is behind a “Veil of Ignorance.”
The second welfare function maximizes the expected lifetime utility of the worker who has the
lowest utility. Although the individual with the lowest utility in my economy is an unemployed
worker with no assets, I choose to focus on an employed worker with no wealth. This has the
additional interpretation of maximizing the welfare of a new labor market entrant with no wealth.
As discussed in Section 5, most individuals, and especially new labor market entrants, hold very
little wealth. In addition, under current law workers only become eligible to receive UI benefits
after being employed for some amount of time.
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Definition (Optimal replacement rate under the “Veil of Ignorance”) Under the “Veil of Ig-
norance,” the optimal UI policy is the replacement rate δ that maximizes the expected lifetime
utility of workers before they realize their labor market state and wealth level, or
δ = arg max (1 − u)
∫ ∞
0
E(a) dGe(a) + u
∫ ∞
0
U(a) dGu(a) (27)
Definition (Optimal replacement rate under the minimax criterion) Under the minimax cri-
terion, the optimal UI policy is the replacement rate δ that maximizes the expected lifetime utility
of an employed worker with no wealth, a = 0, or
δ = arg max E(0) (28)
I find the optimal policy by solving the model for different replacement rates, keeping all
other parameters constant. I then calculate the expected lifetime utility of a worker under both
criteria and measure the welfare gain as a percentage change in the consumption equivalent of
expected lifetime utility (see web Appendix H for more details). The optimal replacement rate
under the “Veil of Ignorance” is 34 percent of average after-tax compensation and is associated
with a 22.2 percent tax on labor income. The optimal replacement rate under the minimax criterion
is 40 percent of average compensation and is associated with a 22.8 percent tax on labor income.
Note that under the “Veil of Ignorance” the optimal replacement rate equals the value to which I
calibrated this economy.
My results suggest that replacement rates in the U.S. are close to optimal. Among the 50 U.S.
states plus the District of Columbia, 24 states have replacement rates between 34 and 40 percent,
15 states have replacement rates below 34 percent and 12 states have replacement rates above 40
percent (see Table 16 in web Appendix I). Table 2 shows a comparison of the current policy with
the optimal policy under the minimax criterion.
The optimal replacement rate weighs the benefits of higher insurance provision and higher
wages against increases in the unemployment and tax rates. A higher replacement rate provides
more insurance by directly increasing the consumption of unemployed workers with few assets.
This makes prolonged unemployment a less scary event and increases workers’ outside option
when bargaining with the firm over wages and hours. As a result hourly wages increase with
higher replacement rates.
As Table 2 reports, low-wealth workers benefit the most from a higher replacement rate. While
average wages increase by only 0.4 percent, hourly wages of no-wealth workers increase by 10.3
percent. This large increase in wages allows low-wealth workers to increase consumption. As a
result, their marginal utility of consumption decreases and, to satisfy the efficiency condition of
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Optimality Criterion Veil of Ignorance Minimax
Difference 
(%)
Optimal Replacement Rate (%) 34 40
Employed with no wealth
Consumption 1.13 1.15 1.9
Saving 0.18 0.19 5.5
Wage 1.51 1.66 10.3
Hours 1.16 1.09 -6.3
After-tax Compensation 1.36 1.40 2.5
Unemployed with no wealth
Consumption 0.34 0.40 16.5
Aggregate Means*
Assets 3.45 3.52 2.3
Consumption 1.26 1.26 -0.4
Wage 1.95 1.96 0.4
Hours 0.85 0.85 0.1
After-tax Compensation 1.28 1.28 -0.3
Tax Rate (%) 22.2 22.8 2.9
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.60 6.49 16.0
Average Unemployment Duration (months) 1.74 2.04 17.1
Welfare Gain**
Minimax criterion 0.00 0.13
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 0.00 -0.12
Note: Assets and saving are measured relative to average consumption of the employed.
* Wage, hours, and after-tax compensation are aggregate averages for the employed. 
** Welfare gain is the percentage change in lifetime utility measured in units of consumption associated 
with moving from the current 34 percent replacement rate to the optimal policy. 
Table 2: Optimal replacement rates in the baseline economy
equation (19), they work fewer hours. At higher UI replacement rates, no-wealth workers receive
higher compensation, enjoy more leisure, and are able to accumulate precautionary wealth more
quickly.
As Figure 4 shows, an increase in the replacement rate increases wages for all workers, al-
though the increase is largest for low-wealth workers. The change in working hours is also largest
for low-wealth workers. For workers with savings worth more than one month of average con-
sumption, more than 99 percent of the population in my model, a higher UI replacement rate
affects working hours very little. Although low-wealth workers decrease their hours by up to 6.3
percent, average hours increase slightly by 0.1 percent.
While consumption of no-wealth individuals unambiguously increases with higher replacement
rates, this is not true for wealthier individuals. Higher replacement rates are associated with higher
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Figure 4: Hours, wages, and wealth distributions in baseline economy (optimal under “Veil of
Ignorance”) and optimal policy under minimax criterion. Current wealth is measured in units of
average monthly consumption of the employed.
unemployment rates and higher labor income taxes. As workers bargain for higher wages, firms’
flow profits (m−w)h decrease, lowering the expected value of hiring a worker (see equation (13)).
This decreases firms’ incentives to post vacancies and results in a lower job-finding rate, a longer
average unemployment duration, and a higher unemployment rate. At a replacement rate of 40
percent, unemployment is 16 percent higher than in the baseline economy. The combination of
higher benefits and a higher unemployment rate requires the government to increase the labor
income tax τ to balance the budget. With a 17 percent increase in unemployment duration, workers
accumulate 2.3 percent more wealth. Compared to the baseline economy, aggregate consumption
is slightly lower in the economy with a replacement rate of 40 percent.
The high levels of the optimal replacement rates are surprising, given that workers may self-
insure through savings. Although it is difficult to compare my results to those in Shimer and
Werning (2005), they conjecture that the optimal replacement rate is low and consistent with find-
ings in Gruber (1997) that the optimal replacement rate is in the range of 0 to 10 percent of income,
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if individuals do not face liquidity constraints. In the more realistic case where individuals are bor-
rowing constrained, they conjecture that optimal replacement rates may be much higher. There are
several reasons why the optimal replacement rate lies between 34 and 40 percent of compensation
in my model economy.
First, individuals in my economy are quite risk-averse. While Shimer and Werning (2005)
choose a low level of risk-aversion with a CRRA coefficient of 1.5, my choice of parameters
implies an average risk-aversion of 3.1. However, even if individuals in my economy were much
less risk-averse, the optimal replacement rate would still be quite high. For an average risk aversion
of 1.5, the optimal policy is still 20 percent of average compensation, see web Appendix C.1.
Second, accumulating and holding precautionary wealth is costly. Accumulating precautionary
wealth is costly because individuals dislike work. In order to increase consumption and to quickly
accumulate wealth, low-wealth workers work unusually long hours, about 40 percent more than
the average worker. Holding precautionary wealth in my model is costly because the individual
discount rate is higher than the return on assets, so that individuals would rather consume today
instead of saving for the future. Shimer and Werning (2005) focus on the consumption/saving and
search behavior of the unemployed and do not model the savings behavior of the employed. The
results of my model indicate that the replacement rate not only influences the behavior and well-
being of the unemployed, but that it also has important effects on the consumption, saving, and
labor supply behavior of the employed.
Under the “Veil of Ignorance” social welfare function, the current policy with a replacement
rate of 34 percent is optimal. The welfare losses from deviating from this policy are potentially
large. Decreasing the replacement rate by 10 percentage points would result in a welfare loss of
0.57 percent. Although average consumption would increase by 0.5 percent, the consumption of
low-wealth individuals would decrease by up to 40 percent. This suggests that this large decrease
in welfare is mostly due to a decrease in insurance provision. A similar-sized increase in the re-
placement rate would result in a welfare loss of approximately 0.4 percent. Although consumption
of low-wealth individuals would increase by up to 30 percent, aggregate consumption would de-
crease by 1 percent, mostly because of an increase in the unemployment rate from 5.6 percent to
7.3 percent.
Under the minimax welfare criterion, the potential welfare gain from moving from the current
replacement rate of 34 percent to the optimal replacement rate of 40 percent is significant: 0.13
percent of expected lifetime utility. As I will discuss in the next subsection, this large increase is
due to an increase in insurance provision and the associated decrease in the need for accumulating
wealth quickly and working long hours. To put this number in perspective, consider that a typical
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Figure 5: Consumption, wages, hours, and saving of employed no-wealth workers. Consumption
and saving are measured in units of average monthly consumption of the employed.
worker who spends 40 years in the labor force spends on average only a little more than two years
in unemployment. On top of paying a 3 percent higher income tax to finance the higher benefit
level, a no-wealth worker would be willing to give up 0.13 percent of lifetime consumption to
move to the optimal policy.
Figure 5 shows consumption, wages, hours worked, and saving of an employed no-wealth
worker as a function of the UI replacement rate. Increasing UI benefits has the predicted effects
on consumption. At the optimal policy according to the minimax criterion, wages are 10.3 percent
higher, hours are 6.3 percent lower, and after-tax compensation is 2.5 percent higher. Of this 2.5
percent increase in compensation, a no-wealth worker uses 67 percent to increase consumption and
33 percent to increase saving.
The reason why the optimal policy is lower under the “Veil of Ignorance” criterion is that the
unemployment rate plays a more important role. Under the minimax criterion, a lower job-finding
rate only enters the social welfare function through the value of an unemployed worker U(a).
31
Under the “Veil of Ignorance” criterion, however, the unemployment rate acts as a welfare weight.
The higher the unemployment rate, the more weight is put on the value of being unemployed,
which is always lower than the value of being employed.
8.1 Isolating the insurance effect of UI benefits
Increasing UI benefits not only provides workers with better insurance, it also increases their out-
side option during bargaining and hence increases their wages. Higher wages, however, reduce
firms’ flow profits, the expected value of hiring a new worker, and hence their recruiting efforts.
As a result, the job-finding rate decreases and the unemployment rate increases.
To isolate the insurance effects of UI benefits I restrict wages to equal the aggregate average
wage in the baseline economy, so that changes in the benefit level no longer affect wages and
unemployment. I then perform the same policy experiment as before with the exception that I keep
wages constant. Working hours are still determined by Nash bargaining, but I replace equation
(17) with w f ixed = E[wNash(a)].
With fixed wages, the benefit level no longer has an effect on the unemployment rate. Figure
6 shows the main results of this exercise. As unemployment benefits increase, workers’ self-
insurance needs decrease. As a result, saving slowly decreases until it reaches zero at a replacement
rate of 87 percent. The number of working hours decreases as well, from 1.0 at the calibration
point to a low of 0.85, a decline of 15 percent. As the saving rate decreases, consumption slowly
increases. A replacement rate of 0.87 percent implies perfect insurance.
The welfare gain from moving from the current policy with a replacement rate of 34 percent
to the optimal policy under the minimax criterion is 0.17 percent of expected lifetime utility. This
is larger than the welfare gain of 0.13 percent achieved from moving to the optimal policy in the
full equilibrium model reported in the previous section. This suggests that the optimal replacement
rate under the minimax criterion is largely determined by low-wealth workers’ need for additional
insurance. The reason why the welfare gain in the equilibrium model with endogenous wage
determination is lower is that the job-finding rate decreases and the unemployment rate increases.
The associated net welfare loss of an increase in the unemployment rate from 5.6 percent in the
baseline economy to 6.5 percent at a replacement rate of 40 percent and an increase in the wage
rate of 10 percent is 0.04 percent (0.17% − 0.13% = 0.04%).
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Figure 6: Consumption, hours, and saving of employed no-wealth worker with fixed wages. Con-
sumption and saving are measured in units of average monthly consumption of the employed with
34 percent replacement rate.
8.2 The role of adjustments in hours
To explore the role of adjustments in hours, I assume that working hours are fixed at the aggregate
average of the baseline economy with δ = 0.34. I replace equation (18) with the constant h = 0.85
but leave all other equations and parameters unchanged. The results are reported in Table 3.
In the economy with fixed hours and a replacement rate of 34 percent, a no-wealth worker
spends 27 percent less time working than in the baseline economy with efficient determination
of hours, although not by choice. Because workers do not have the ability to adjust hours, their
expected lifetime utility is lower than in the economy where hours are determined efficiently. Al-
though the bargained wage of a no-wealth worker is 11 percent higher than in the baseline econ-
omy, total compensation is almost 20 percent lower. As a result, consumption is 17 percent lower
and saving is 31 percent lower compared to the baseline economy with efficient determination of
hours.
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Optimality Criterion Veil of Ignorance Minimax
Baseline, 
δ = 0.34
Veil of 
Ignorance Minimax
Optimal Replacement Rate (%) 34 40 34 31 39
Employed with no wealth
Consumption 1.13 1.16 0.94 0.89 0.99
Saving 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.13
Wage 1.51 1.66 1.67 1.58 1.77
Hours 1.16 1.09 0.85 0.85 0.85
After-tax Compensation 1.36 1.40 1.10 1.05 1.16
Aggregate Means*
Assets 3.45 3.52 4.21 4.23 4.18
Tax Rate (%) 22.2 22.8 22.3 22.0 22.8
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.60 6.49 5.81 5.42 6.52
Average Unemployment Duration (months) 1.74 2.04 1.82 1.68 2.05
Welfare Gain**
Minimax criterion 0.00 0.13 -0.17 0.09
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.19
Note: Assets and saving are measured relative to average consumption of the employed.
* Wage, hours, and after-tax compensation are aggregate averages for the employed. 
** Welfare gain is the percentage change in lifetime utility measured in units of consumption associated with moving from the 
current 34 percent replacement rate to the optimal policy. 
Fixed HoursEfficient Hours
Table 3: Optimal replacement rates and the role of adjustments in hours
Interestingly, average consumption, wages, and income differ only very slightly, all by less
then 0.8 percent. While saving of the no-wealth worker is lower in the fixed-hours economy,
aggregate wealth is 22 percent higher. Since no-wealth workers are unable to quickly increase their
precautionary balances when needed (for example, after an unemployment spell), they choose to
accumulate more wealth to have an extra buffer when becoming unemployed. This large increase
in precautionary wealth is surprising given that very few workers ever get close to the borrowing
constraint.
When working hours are adjustable, low-wealth workers spend more time on the job, have
higher incomes, and save more. Yet, aggregate wealth is highest in the fixed hours economy. This
strongly suggests that low-wealth workers work longer hours in order to accumulate precautionary
wealth more quickly. If they are unable to adjust hours, workers choose to accumulate considerably
more wealth to ensure that they will have the means to keep a smooth consumption profile even
in the unlikely case of multiple unemployment spells with only short employment durations in
between.
Surprisingly, when I do not allow workers to adjust hours, the optimal replacement rate is lower
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than when hours are set efficiently. As I discussed in the previous section, low-wealth workers
decrease working hours considerably with increases in the replacement rate. The decrease in hours
is associated with an increase in utility. When workers are not allowed to adjust hours, the benefit
of a higher replacement rate decreases, while the cost, an increase in the unemployment rate,
stays the same. Hence the optimal replacement rate is lower to balance the marginal cost with the
marginal benefit to the worker.
These results suggest that preferences over hours are a potentially important determinant of the
optimal UI policy. When working longer hours is relatively costly (in this extreme example it is
infinitely costly) compared to accumulating and holding wealth, workers will substitute saving for
working longer hours. When hours of work do not respond to changes in the benefit level, as in
this example, the optimal replacement rate is lower.
9 The cost of self-insuring
As discussed before, self-insuring in my model is costly for two reasons. First, accumulating
precautionary wealth is costly because workers dislike work. Low-wealth workers work usually
long hours to increase consumption and to quickly build up wealth. However, this carries a high
utility cost. Higher UI benefits increase consumption of the constrained workers directly and
increases their marginal utility of consumption. For equation (19) to hold, hours must decrease.
Thus, higher benefits not only increase insurance, but also reduce the need for constrained workers
to work unusually long hours.
The second reason why self-insuring is costly is that workers are unable to save at an interest
rate r equal to their personal discount rate ρ. As I discussed in detail in Section 5.3, data on
household wealth suggests that the annual personal discount rate is ρa = 0.05 when the annual
risk-free interest rate is ra = 0.03. Since ra < ρa, workers would rather consume income today
than save for tomorrow. The cost of holding precautionary wealth is increasing in the difference
ρa − ra.
9.1 Implications of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is one determinant of the utility cost of working (the other is
the distaste parameter γ). To assess its effect on labor supply, saving, and the optimal UI policy,
I repeat my earlier calibration for a range of elasticities. I keep the average Frisch elasticity of
consumption demand at ϕ(c, h) = −0.35 and the average consumption drop at ω = 0.10. I calibrate
with different values for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η(c, h) to get new values for the
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Figure 7: Hours and wealth distributions for different Frisch elasticities η. Hours are measured
relative to the mean of each economy. Wealth is measured in units of average monthly consumption
of the employed.
parameters σ, µ, and ψ. Table 13 in web Appendix I contains the new parameter values for the
range of labor supply elasticities I consider. The parameter ψ changes proportionally with the
Frisch elasticity, while changes in the other parameters are modest. The only other parameter that
changes is the vacancy creation cost k. It has to change with the Frisch elasticity to maintain an
unemployment rate of 5.6 percent at the calibration point.
The level of the Frisch elasticity has large effects on labor supply, income, saving and thus the
wealth distribution. The higher the Frisch elasticity, the more workers adjust hours in response
to changes in the wage, holding marginal utility of consumption constant. Figure 7 shows work-
ing hours and wealth distributions as functions of current wealth for three levels of the Frisch
elasticity. The choices of Frisch elasticities I consider are consistent with estimates provided by
MaCurdy (1981), Browning et al. (1985), and Altonji (1986) (Frisch elasticity of η(c, h) = 0.30),
and Mulligan (1995, 1998) and Kimball and Shapiro (2003) (Frisch elasticity of η(c, h) = 1.10).
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Frisch Elasticity of Labor 
Supply η(c,h) 0.30 0.70 1.10
Optimal Replacement Rate (%)
Minimax criterion 45 40 36
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 34 34 34
Employed with no wealth
Consumption 1.13 1.13 1.14
Saving 0.14 0.18 0.21
Wage 1.57 1.51 1.46
Hours 1.09 1.16 1.23
After-tax Compensation 1.32 1.36 1.40
Aggregate Means*
Assets 3.88 3.45 3.27
Consumption 1.37 1.26 1.22
Wages 1.93 1.95 1.96
Hours 0.92 0.84 0.81
After-tax Compensation 1.38 1.28 1.24
Tax Rate (%) 22.3 22.2 22.1
Welfare Gain (%)**
Minimax criterion 0.33 0.12 0.01
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 0.00 0.00 0.00
All results are with replacement rate δ=0.34.
Note: Assets and saving are measured relative to average consumption of 
the employed.
* Wages, hours, and after-tax compensation are aggregate averages for
 the employed. 
** Welfare gain is the percentage change in lifetime utility measured in 
units of consumption associated with moving from the current 34 
percent replacement rate to the optimal policy. 
Table 4: Implications of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η
The replacement and unemployment rates are the same as in the baseline economy, that is δ = 0.34
and u = 0.056. The number of working hours are measured relative to the mean number of hours
in each economy.
Workers close to the borrowing constraint work considerably harder than the average worker.
This difference is increasing in the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. With a low Frisch elasticity
of η = 0.30, a constrained worker spends 17 percent more time working than the average worker.
With a high elasticity of η = 1.10, a constrained worker spends 51 percent more time on the job
than the average worker. The slope of the marginal disutility of working, uhh, is decreasing in
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. To satisfy equation (19), this means that hours of work must
increase more as the marginal utility of consumption increases close to the borrowing constraint.
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Figure 8: Saving behavior of the employed and unemployed for different Frisch elasticities η.
Saving and current wealth are measured in units of average monthly consumption of the employed.
Intuitively, the higher the Frisch elasticity, the less costly it is for workers to adjust hours.
As Table 4 shows, workers with no assets but a high Frisch elasticity of η = 1.10 work 13
percent more than their low-elasticity counterparts with η = 0.30. Although hourly wages are 7
percent lower for the high-elasticity workers, after-tax compensation is 6 percent, consumption
1.2 percent, and saving 50 percent higher. The difference in consumption between a constrained
worker and the average worker is largest for workers with a low labor-supply elasticity. Con-
strained workers with a Frisch elasticity of η = 0.30 consume 17 percent less than the average
worker, while a constrained worker with a Frisch elasticity of η = 1.10 consumes only 7 percent
less than the average worker.
As Figure 8 shows, workers with high Frisch elasticities save more initially to build up wealth
quickly. It takes a worker with a high Frisch elasticity about 17 months of continuous employment
to accumulate assets worth two months of average consumption, while it takes a low-elasticity
worker about 24 months. Since adjusting hours is more costly for workers with low Frisch elastic-
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ities, they accumulate wealth more slowly than their high elasticity counterparts.
Getting close to the borrowing constraint is worse for workers with a low Frisch elasticity than
for workers with a high Frisch elasticity of consumption. The marginal utility of consumption and
the marginal disutility of working at the borrowing constraint (relative to the respective average
marginal utilities) are considerably higher for workers with low elasticities of labor supply. Be-
cause being close to the borrowing constraint is worse for low-elasticity workers, they accumulate
considerably more wealth than high-elasticity workers.
Given these results, it should not be surprising that the optimal replacement rate is decreasing
in the Frisch elasticity. Because the cost of adjusting hours is lower for workers with a high Frisch
elasticity, they are better able to self-insure and benefit less from a higher replacement rate. The
welfare gains associated with moving from the current policy to the optimal policy are as large as
0.33 percent of lifetime utility for workers with low Frisch elasticities.
9.2 Implications of the cost of holding wealth
The cost of holding wealth is determined by the difference between the annual interest rate ra at
which workers may save, and the annual personal discount rate of workers, ρa. To investigate the
role that the cost of holding wealth plays in the determination of the optimal replacement rate, I
solve the model with different values for ρa, leaving the remaining calibration unchanged. I report
the results in Table 5.
Higher discount rates have almost no effect on most variables, except for aggregate assets.
With a personal discount rate very close to the interest rate, workers accumulate substantially more
wealth than with higher discount rates. With a discount rate of 3.3 percent, average assets equal
7.3 months of average consumption, or close to twice as much as in the baseline economy with a
discount rate of 5 percent. Assuming that precautionary wealth represents about 20 percent of total
wealth, this number would imply a median wealth-to-income ratio of 3.2, about twice as high as
the one measured in the data (see Section 5.3). With a discount rate of 10 percent, average assets
equal only 2.2 months of average consumption and imply a median wealth-to-income ratio of 1.
As the cost of holding wealth increases, so does the optimal replacement rate. Lentz (2005)
appears to have been the first to point out the relationship between the optimal replacement rate
and the spread between the interest rate and the personal discount rate in a search model with
savings. He fixes the subjective time discount rate and then varies the interest rate. My analysis
here simply shows that the difference between the interest rate and the personal discount rates of
workers matters for the optimal policy.
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Annual subjective discount rate ρa (%) 3.3 6.0 8.0 10.0
Aggregate Means
Assets 7.27 3.00 2.49 2.19
Optimal Replacement Rate (%)
Minimax criterion 36 40 43 44
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 34 35 36 38
Welfare Gain (%)*
Minimax criterion 0.02 0.21 0.37 0.55
"Veil of Ignorance" criterion 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06
All results are with replacement rate δ=0.34.
Note: Assets are measured relative to average consumption of the employed.
* Welfare gain is the percentage change in lifetime utility measured in units of consumption 
associated with moving from the current 34 percent replacement rate to the optimal policy. 
Table 5: Implications of the cost of holding wealth
10 Concluding remarks
I analyzed how individuals’ costs of self-insuring affect the determination of the optimal UI re-
placement rate. I conducted my analysis within a standard equilibrium matching model that I
extended along three important lines. First, workers are risk-averse and have preferences over
consumption and hours of work, which I calibrated to match results from micro studies on labor
supply, the intertemporal substitution of consumption, and the complementarity between hours of
work and consumption. Second, I explicitly model the intensive margin of labor supply as the
outcome of bilaterally efficient bargaining between workers and firms. Third, I allow workers to
self-insure by saving a riskless asset at an exogenously given interest rate.
My results suggest that the cost of accumulating and holding precautionary wealth is an impor-
tant determinant of the optimal UI policy. Accumulating precautionary wealth is costly because
working higher than usual hours imposes a utility cost on workers. Holding precautionary wealth
is expensive because the interest rate at which individuals may save is lower than their personal
discount rate. A high UI benefit level alleviates these costs to some degree, in addition to providing
workers insurance against unusually long unemployment spells that would result in consumption
disasters.
There are a few issues future research should address. First, I assumed that Shimer and Wern-
ing’s (2005) result that the optimal UI policy involves constant benefits of indefinite duration and
a constant tax rate upon reemployment also holds in my model economy. This assumption needs
further investigation. On the one hand, the fact that the marginal utility of consumption increases
considerably the closer workers get to the borrowing constraint suggests that an increasing benefit
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schedule might be optimal. On the other hand, an increasing benefit schedule will most likely dis-
tort the savings behavior of the employed considerably. Why save if you are only rewarded when
you have few assets?
Future research should pay closer attention to generating the earnings, income, and wealth dis-
tributions observed in the U.S. economy. Heterogeneity among works and/or firms will obviously
be important to achieve such a goal. Investigating the efficiency of means-tested UI benefits would
be an interesting topic, as would be analyzing the role of insurance provision by family members,
such as spouses or parents, and the role of life-cycle savings in providing an additional source of
liquidity to otherwise constrained workers.
From a more theoretical perspective, investigating the bargaining between the worker and the
firm would be of interest. In my model the interests of workers and firms are orthogonal. Workers
want to accumulate assets to self-insure and to increase their bargaining position, while firms would
prefer workers to remain poor indefinitely. How would the results change if workers were to save
strategically? Could the firm offer a contract that aligns their interests with that of the workers?
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Appendix
A Details of the solution method
I represent the unknown functions as Chebyshev polynomials of degree 10 and use projection
methods as described in Judd (1992) and chapter 11 in Judd (1998) to solve for the 70 Cheby-
shev coefficients. I solve the following system of equations by finding the zeros of the 7 residual
functions R j(d j; a), where d j is the 1x10 vector of Chebyshev coefficients associated with function
j.
RE(dE; a) = Ê(a) − u(ĉe(a), ĥ(a)) + 11 + ρ
[
sÛ(a′) + (1 − s)Ê(a′)
]
(29)
RU(dU ; a) = Û(a) − u(̂cu(a), 0) + 11 + ρ
[
f (θ)Ê(a′) + (1 − f (θ))Û(a′)
]
(30)
RJ(dJ; a) = Ĵ(a) − [m − ŵ(a)]̂h(a) + 1 − s1 + r Ĵ(a
′) (31)
Rue(due; a) = uc(ĉe(a), h(a)) −
1 + r
1 + ρ
[
suc(ĉu(a′), 0) + (1 − s)uc(ĉe(a′), ĥ(a′))
]
(32)
Ruu(duu; a) = uc(ĉu(a), 0) −
1 + r
1 + ρ
[
f (θ)uc(ĉe(a′), ĥ(a′)) + (1 − f (θ))uc(ĉu(a′), 0)
]
(33)
Rw(dw; a) =
φ
(1 − φ) Ĵ(a) −
Ê(a) − Û(a)
uc(ĉe(a), ĥ(a))(1 − τ)
(34)
Rh(dh; a) =
−uh(ĉe(a), ĥ(a))
uc(ĉe(a), ĥ(a))
− (1 − τ)m (35)
where
ĉu(a) = b + (1 + r)a − a′u(a) (36)
ĉe(a) = (1 − τ)w(a)h(a) + (1 + r)a − a′e(a) (37)
A solution to this system of equations is given by the 70 coefficients d j that solve the 7 equations
R j(d j; a) = 0 at the 10 Chebyshev collocation nodes chosen from a ∈ [a, a]. Because the job-
finding rate depends on the wealth distribution (see equation (13)), I use the following iterative
algorithm to solve the equilibrium model.
1. Given the parameters of the model, make a guess for the job-finding rate (for the calibration
this is simply the calibration target)
2. Solve the the model by finding the zeros of the 7 residual functions R j(d j; a)
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3. Calculate the steady-state wealth distributions Ge(a) and Gu(a) following Hall (2006a)
4. Approximate E[J(a′)] in equation (13) by calculating E[J(a′)] 
∑
Ĵ(a)Ĝu(a)
5. Update the vacancy/unemployment ratio θ by calculating
θ =
(
(1 + r)k
m0E[J(a′)]
)−1/α
6. Calculate the new job-finding rate as f (θ) = ζθ1−α
7. Update the tax rate τ by solving equation (21) as
τ 
u b + χ
(1 − u) ∑w(a)h(a)Ge(a)
8. Exit the iteration if the proportional change in E[J(a′)] and f (θ) is sufficiently small; I use
10−6 as my stopping rule. Otherwise, start a new iteration at number 1 above with the new
guess for the job-finding rate being the result of this iteration.
When solving the system of equations above, it is important to have a good initial guess for
the 70 coefficients of the 7 unknown functions. Without a good guess, even very good non-linear
equation solvers such as NPSOL are unable to find a solution. To generate a sufficiently good
guess for all 70 coefficients, I proceed as follows.
1. Make a guess for the 20 coefficients due and duu and, treating w and h as parameters, solve
the system
Rue(due; a) = 0
Ruu(duu; a) = 0
2. Make a guess for the 20 coefficients dE and dU and use the result for due and duu as an initial
guess to solve
Rue(due; a) = 0
Ruu(duu; a) = 0
RE(dE; a) = 0
RU(dU ; a) = 0,
again treating w and h as parameters.
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3. Make a guess for dJ, dw, and dh and use the results for dE, dU , due , and duu as an initial guess
to solve the full system of 70 equations in 70 unknowns.
For discussions of the parameters choices, the strategic consumption choices, the Nash bargain
solution, a derivation of the Frisch elasticities, more information on the solution method, and an
explanation of how to calculate the welfare gains, please see the web Appendix at http://felixr.
googlepages.com/webapp.pdf.
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